THE NIGERIAN BORDER AND SECURITY ISSUES

In light of numerous studies attributing the facilitation of cross-national criminal activities to the porous nature of Nigeria’s borders, the implementation of a comprehensive border closure emerges as a viable resolution to the prevailing situation. The policy of good neighbourliness, the Pan-African worldview held by political leaders, and Nigeria’s perceived hegemonic leadership in Africa resulted in the implementation of an idealistic border policy. Nonetheless, President Buhari, firmly believing that implementing border closures might effectively address the ongoing issues of insecurity and economic disruption in Nigeria, disregarded Abuja’s Afrocentric principles and opted for a novel approach to border diplomacy. In a manner reminiscent of the border policy implemented during the military rule of General Muhammadu Buhari from 1983 to 1984, the democratic government led by President Buhari took the decision to close the country’s land borders on 20 August 2019. The implementation of border closure was primarily motivated by the significant national security threat posed by jihadist insurgencies and armed banditry in northern Nigeria, as well as the economic crises resulting from cross-border smuggling activities. The cross-border character of the security situation in northern Nigeria has raised significant concerns among the Nigerian population as a whole, as well as policymakers specifically. Throughout the majority of their existence, Boko Haram and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) have consistently demonstrated a preference for border regions, particularly the frontier areas that lie between Nigeria and the riparian states of Lake Chad. This pattern of activity has led scholars such as MacEachern to classify the ‘Boko Haram insurgency’ as a phenomenon primarily associated with borderlands. The issue of Nigeria’s porous and poorly maintained borders has been identified as a contributing factor to the persistent nature of terrorism in the northern region of the country. According to Agbiboa (year), the increasing attacks by Boko Haram since 2009 have been mostly attributed to the inadequate implementation of border management measures in Nigeria. Similar to Boko Haram and its breakaway group, ISWAP, the activities of bandits persist across borderlands, so rendering this criminal behaviour an international phenomenon. Hence, in order to address these obstacles, including other transnational economic issues, the justification for implementing the new border policy was provided. The government asserted that the implementation of the new border regime yielded positive outcomes. According to their statement, the closure of the borders resulted in a significant reduction, approximately 95%, in the flow of weapons and ammunition to various criminal groups such as Boko Haram, kidnappers, herdsmen, and armed robbers. Additionally, the joint collaboration among security agencies effectively managed the entry of illegal immigrants and cross-border criminals into the country.

In recent times, there has been a notable escalation in the severity of banditry. Despite implementing several precautions, such as the closure of borders, Nigeria had a significant surge in abductions by bandits, with a staggering 169% rise seen between 2019 and 2020. The escalating operational efficiency of armed nonstate actors, including bandits, within the nation has resulted in significant human and economic burdens for the Nigerian populace. The emergence of bandit insurgency in Nigeria can be attributed to the inherent dysfunctionality of the Nigerian state, which is characterised by a significant lack of governance capacity. However, it is important to note that this criminal phenomenon has also acquired a transnational dimension due to the inadequate management of Nigeria’s international boundaries. The permeability and inadequate regulation of the Nigerian borders contribute to the illicit transnational migration of criminal actors into the country. The presence of several nationalities among criminal elements engaged in Islamist insurgency and armed banditry poses significant complexities to the existing security difficulties in the country, hence impeding the effectiveness of countermeasures implemented to mitigate these threats. One illustrative instance is the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), which operates as a regional branch of the well recognised Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Additionally, the Boko Haram breakaway faction has formed alliances with several radical Islamist organisations, particularly within the Sahelian region, where it receives support in terms of training, weaponry, and personnel. The efficacy of the recently implemented border policy, particularly in its ability to effectively handle the issue of insecurity in northern Nigeria, has sparked many disputes.

The success of the border shutdown was acknowledged by the Nigerian National Assembly. The Senate, which had consistently endorsed the government’s security programme, contends that the policy has resulted in a regression of the progress previously achieved by the terrorists. The legislative body contended that the border blockade had effectively curtailed the provision of weaponry and munitions to Boko Haram and ISWAP. The legislative branch has observed a decline in the frequency of attacks inside the North-eastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, regions that have had prolonged terrorist activities. Likewise, Senator Ibrahim Abdullahi Gobir, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on National Security and Intelligence, commended the border closure for its positive impact on enhancing the security situation in the northern region of Nigeria. When evaluating the effects of the border policy, Security Watchers have expressed their approval of the programme, highlighting the significant reduction, if not complete cessation, of arms delivery to Nigeria via the Sahel Maghreb axis. The result was achieved through collaboration between the Nigerian Customs Service and other security services, led by the Office of the National Security Adviser, as reported by the observatory group. Despite the optimistic portrayal presented earlier, a pragmatic evaluation of the effects of the border policy would suggest that instead of effectively mitigating the Boko Haram insurgency and the prevalence of armed banditry, the closure of the border has not yielded any lasting results in resolving the issue of insecurity within the nation. Kwarkye and Matongbada have argued that instead of effectively addressing cross-border criminality, the closure of the borders has inadvertently facilitated the emergence of new smuggling routes. This is due to cross-border criminals taking advantage of the linguistic and socio-economic connections within border communities to carry out their illicit activities. The government’s decision to close in response to the ongoing security threat should be assessed in light of the government’s history of disseminating misleading information during discussions on national security. Throughout history, the government’s reaction to security concerns has frequently been marked by the use of official prevarications.

The permeability of Nigeria’s borderlines and international boundaries, coupled with the presence of numerous bandit and terrorist organisations in the sparsely governed rural areas, has predictably resulted in a conducive environment for the illicit trade of firearms. This has consequently led to the widespread proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), further exacerbating the security situation within the country. The security situation of the country is seen highly concerning, as highlighted by the influential London journal, Financial Times. It cautions that without significant changes, there is a potential risk of the nation descending into a failed state. According to the Global Terrorist Index 2020, the nation has been ranked as the third most terrorised state globally. This classification is attributed to the persistent occurrences of armed banditry and the resurgence of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. The inadequately regulated regions located in the remote areas and along the borders have been subject to exploitation by criminal cartels, which engage in many forms of violent criminal activities including but not limited to kidnapping for ransom, indiscriminate killings, cattle theft, as well as the looting of communities, markets, and mining sites. The abrupt and independent implementation of the closure resulted in resentment towards Nigeria from neighbouring states, as they were not in favour of Abuja’s decision to prevent the entry of criminals and illicit goods into the country.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the underlying reasons for the decision-making and execution of the border closure by the Nigerian government, despite its significant implications for Nigeria’s Afrocentric external relations. This move has resulted in prioritising nationalism over regionalism within the ECOWAS area. The study investigated the factors responsible for the occurrence of failure. The findings indicate that the security difficulties in northern Nigeria are complex, and the inadequate regulation of national borders, despite the implementation of a new border strategy, continues to contribute significantly to the worsening of the crises. The illicit transfer of arms, ammunition, and other prohibited goods persists into Nigeria through ostensibly restricted borders, particularly those shared with Niger, Chad, and Benin Republic. In the northeastern region, there is an ongoing practise of relocating fish from areas under the authority of Boko Haram near Lake Chad to markets that are under the jurisdiction of regional administrations. Additionally, there is a continued occurrence of violent Fulani herders crossing borders, which now includes territories controlled by ISWAP. The Arewa Consultative Forum, a socio-political body representing the northern region of Nigeria, has expressed concern regarding the activities of criminals and their foreign associates who are utilising camels as a means to smuggle advanced weaponry, including Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and anti-aircraft guns, across the northern borders of the country.

In order to mitigate the influx of weapons and foreign criminal elements into Nigeria, it is imperative to reassess the nation’s approach to border governance. In the context of West Africa, Nigeria is commonly regarded as a dominant power, and within this framework, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) presents the most effective regional structure for facilitating collaborative border governance. This approach aligns with the objectives outlined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396. The Resolution underscores the imperative for governments to undertake measures pertaining to efficient border security, the exchange of information, and collaboration. In addition, the implementation of advanced border surveillance technology by the government has assumed a critical significance in order to enhance the efficacy of policing efforts. It is imperative for Nigeria to demonstrate its aptitude in effectively governing itself, ensuring the safeguarding of its citizens’ lives and properties in alignment with constitutional provisions. The city of Abuja needs to possess the capacity to effectively implement its policies, obtain obedience from its citizens, and establish a sense of legitimacy within its territorial jurisdiction.

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