Introduction
The Nigerian Civil War or Nigeria-Biafra War, as it is commonly known was a civil war that erupted as a result of a myriad of ideological, political, religious and economic differences, disagreements and disputes between the federal government-led Nigeria and Republic of Biafra, which as of 1967, was a secessionist group that had declared its independence from Nigeria. The war projected the national aspirations and goals of the people of Eastern Nigeria (majority of who were of Igbo ethnicity) whose leadership headed by Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu decided they could no longer co-exist with the Nigerian government whose leadership was dominated by the interests of the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigerian extraction.
Drawing from the implications of ethnic division, religious tension, military coup and countercoup, anti-Igbo pogrom in Northern Nigeria and the monopolistic control of the federal republic of Nigeria over the oil bearing areas of the Niger Delta, one may not be surprised with the rapid emergence of the events leading to the war which had lasted between July 6 1967 and January 15 1970.[1]
Having recorded the death of about 45,000 – 100,000 combatants, 2,000,000 Biafra civilian deaths as a result of famine due to the blockade, 2,000,000 – 4, 500,000 displaced persons plus the 500,000 people that fled overseas,[2] one may not be wrong to say that the Nigerian civil war was not only a premeditated plot to exterminate a people whose existence was perceived as threat to the country, but also was the most profound hostility that brought about one of the biggest humanitarian crisis in Africa. More importantly, the thrust of this seminar is to examine the cause and effect of humanitarian activities and interventions during the Nigerian civil war.
Overview of the Nigerian Civil War
The country known as Nigeria today existed as a number of independent and sometimes hostile nations with distinct cultural and language differences until 1900. The building of Nigeria as a state began in 1900 with the creation of the Northern and Southern protectorates along with the colony of Lagos by the British government.[3] Efforts made at unifying these protectorates started in May 1906 when the colony of Lagos and protectorate of Southern Nigeria, which had existed separately were integrated to become the colony and protectorate of Southern Nigeria.[4] Prior to this time, the Northern and Southern administrations were separate entities that existed independently and were directly answerable to the colonial office. Suffice it to say that the first momentous act of the British in the political evolution of Nigeria as a state was the amalgamation of the administration of the two protectorates on January 1, 1914 by Sir. Lord Lugard, the Governor General of Nigeria.[5]
In order to be able to govern the entity called Nigeria with ease, the British introduced indirect rule policy in the two sections of the country with the amalgamated administration based in Lagos. As a result, Nigeria was split into two different socio-cultural, political and economic backgrounds and developments within the country.[6] Interestingly, the 1922 constitutional development in the country made provisions for the first time, for elected members to sit on a Nigerian legislative council, but however, did not empower them to make laws. Nigeria was split into four administrative units in 1940 namely: the colony of Lagos and the Northern, Eastern and Western provinces. This administrative division, with increased power for the colony and provinces, was not only maintained but separateness was also strengthened by Sir Arthur Richard’s constitution in 1946.[7] The Richard’s constitution inaugurated Nigeria’s regionalism. Furthermore, the post-World War II awareness and consequent upsurge of nationalism in Africa helped facilitate the impact of the Richard’s constitution under which political parties were formed on the basis of regional and ethnic standing. This situation paved way for the emergence of regionalism.[8]
With the emergence of the John Macpherson’s constitution of 1951, a greater measure of autonomy was granted to the regions with stronger regional legislatures.[9] In 1953, the central cabinet was split over the acceptance of a date for securing self-government. The end result of this situation was the Kano riot.[10]Consequently, these trends of events brought about the widening of regional divisions, and for the first time, the people of Northern Nigeria intensely debated on the issue of secession. In the same vein, Western Nigeria also threatened to secede over the non-inclusion of Lagos (West) in the new constitution. The 1954 Lyttleton’s constitution formalised the wishes of Nigerian leaders to remain far apart as they possibly could. The choice between military and federal options in the form of government had been made and the leaders settled for federal option.[11] Thereafter, there were series of constitutional conferences that were held in 1957, 1958, 1959, and in 1960 leading to the independence of Nigeria in October 1, 1960.[12]
It is important to note that from 1954 onward, the political direction of Nigeria lost its gaze for a firm and unified central government. Howbeit, what was obtainable was the regional base of each major political party. As a result, all political leaders with strong bases in their regions fought hard for equal power which in turn, resulted in the weakness of the central government. In the same vein, issues bordering on tribalism and sectionalism had engulfed the country and consequently, fanned into a dangerous flame by all the political leaders. Rather than regionalism ensuring and preserving national unity, it became an even more divisive agent. Explaining this situation, Olusegun Obasanjo writes, “The only point on which Nigerian political leaders spoke with one voice was the granting of political independence by the British and even then, they did not agree on the timing.” Furthermore, with the granting of independence, in 1960, all the dirt swept under the carpet (religious intolerance, ethnic division and corruption resurfaced and Nigeria was once again beset by strings of political challenges informed by the lopsided nature of the political divisions of the country and the kind of existing federal constitution, and the sprit in which it operated.[13]
With the abrogation of the Defense pact between Great Britain and Nigeria in December 1962 coupled together with later developments in the country’s turbulent political history namely: census crisis of 1962, Tiv Riot against the NPC rule of the North (1962-1965), general election crisis of 1964, the country was set for the advent of greater turbulence. This was the situation of the country when the coup of January 15, 1966 took place. The outcome of the coup was a change of political balance in the country and in addition, it happened that virtually all the political and senior military officers that were killed came from the North and Western regions except for a few politicians and military officers from the East and the West respectively.[14]
Due to the fact that most of the planners were of Eastern origin and basically of Igbo extraction, the northerners in particular, perceived the coup as a deliberate plan to eliminate the political fathers of Northern Nigeria in order to pave way for the Easterners to take over the leadership from them. In retaliation, the northern military officers staged a countercoup on July 29 1966. The countercoup resulted in the killings of the then Head of State, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi and many other senior officers of Eastern origin. Afterward, the then Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, who was at that time, the most senior officer of Northern origin and the Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army, emerged as the new Nigerian political leader. The lack of thorough planning and the revengeful intentions of the countercoup manifested itself in the chaos and scale of unnecessary killings of Easterners (precisely Igbo people) throughout the country. In an effort to put a stop to the killings, and preserve the country, an ad hoc conference of the representatives of the regions was called on August 9, 1966 in Lagos. The number one recommendation of the meeting was executed on August 13, 1966 when troops of Eastern Nigerian origin serving outside their region were officially reposted to Enugu, the then capital of the Eastern region, while troops of non-Eastern region in Enugu moved to Kaduna and Lagos respectively.[15]This particular event marked the beginning of division within the rank and file of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Furthermore, none of the other recommendations of the meeting in August 13 was received full attention except for the nullification of the Unification Decree.
In the course of events, the East and North began a violence of words through their radios and newspapers. Early in 1967, a peace negotiation meeting of the Supreme Military Council of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Eastern region military governor, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Ojukwu was called under the auspices of General Ankrah in Aburi, Ghana. Different perspectives of what took place in Aburi were revealed by Ojukwu in the East and by the federal military government in Lagos. While Ojukwu accused the federal government of bad faith and insincerity in keeping to promises and agreements, the federal military government accused Ojukwu of distortions and half-truths.[16] After several meetings among the federal and regional offices, what amounted to the demise of the federation then was promulgated in decree No. 8 of 17 March 1967 in a desperate effort to execute the Aburi decisions and to avoid possible civil war. Be that as it may, Ojukwu rejected the decree because it fell short of full implementation of the Aburi decisions. With this, the die was cast and subsequent efforts to resolve the tension that had heated the polity was to no avail.
As early as June 7, 1966 after the May incident where many Igbo people were killed, Ojukwu was quoted as saying “we are finished with the federation. It is all a question of time.”[17] He went on to seize some federal government properties and funds in the East. He planned the hijacking of a national commercial aircraft – Fokker 27 on a scheduled flight from Benin to Lagos. These signs among other reports convinced the federal military government of Ojukwu’s intention to break away from the federation. Reacting to Ojukwu’s actions, Yakubu Gowon imposed a total blockade of the East. He went ahead to create twelve new states out of the regions with the main aim of disorganising Ojukwu’s plans and claims over the resources and peoples of the Eastern region. The reaction from Enugu was quick as it officially announced the declaration of Eastern Nigeria as the independent sovereign state of “Biafra” on May 30, 1967 from Nigeria. With the sounding of the first bullet at the dawn of July 1967 from the Nigeria-led federal military government side, the Nigerian civil war began.
Humanitarian Activities during the war
According to Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, the Biafra incident led to the first major famine to be addressed through media images of starving Africa, before Ethiopia in 1984 and Somalia in 1992.[18] However, the incident attracted a lot of humanitarian responses through the provision of aid and relief materials by international organisations, charities and governments of different countries across the continent. Strategic contribution of relief to the Biafran war was twofold. While it was in the form of logistical assistance, it also took the form of financial assistance.[19]First, plans were an important link to the outside world after the last Biafran access to the sea. Humanitarian organiosations especially the Catholic Caritas and the Scandinavian protestant churches were very instrumental in setting up Air Bridge from Sao Tome. Also, the Norwegian Church relief, for instance, circumvented the federal authorities because Lagos restrictd it from supplying its aid to the Biafrans and thus diverted one of its food cargos to Santa Isabel (Equatorial Guinea).[20]
After a special visit to Portugal, the Norwegian Church began to send provisions from the Portuguese island of Sao Tome in the planes of an American adventurer – Hank Wharton, who equally carried weapons for the Biafrans.[21] With its Danish, Swedish and Finish counterparts, the Norwegian church relief eventually participated in August 1968 in the creation of “Nordchurchaid”- an ad hoc organisation in collaboration with a company based in Reykjavik, to send food to Sa Tome, from where relief was then transported to Biafra by a consortium of some thirty European and American Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), the Joint Church Aid (JCA) later nicknamed – Jesus Christ Airlines.
The Norwegian Church Relief funded $2 million out of a total of $7 million spent during these operations, which were sourced in June 1969 by organisations like Save the Children, Oxfam and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). From August up to September 1968, the Jesus Christ Airlines was headed by Carl-Gustaf von Rosen, a Swedish count to rebuild the Biafran Airforce in May 1969. Interestingly, the internal rules of the Nord Churchaid did not mention the restriction of weapons, and the cargo included spare parts for trucks that were supposed to deliver food to the Biafrans as well as transport troops.[22] The support was obvious in order to keep receiving weapons and planes. At this time in question, the Biafran troops were only left with only one airstrip which was located at Uli in Anambra State but the Jesus Christ Airlines agreed to enlarge it and keep it operational.
On its own, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) became involved in the war zone by offering services to the belligerents. It inquired after the fate of prisoners of war and supported the activities of local Red Cross societies by providing equipment and medical staff. At the end of 1967, also started relief operations for civilians affected by the war on both sides of the warring nations.[23] When famine caught up with Biafra in 1969, the organisation focused more on helping starving victims. For the ICRC, the greatest challenge they experienced was the difficulty of obtaining the consent of the order to bring in food into Biafra which was blockaded by the Nigerian government. Despite the difficulty, the ICRC in September 1968 stablished an airlift for Biafra. In accordance with the principle of impartiality, and to avoid operating only in the Biafran side, ICRC also set up and coordinated its operation in the area recaptured by the federal army.
At the end of 1969, the situation of things got intense and worse for Biafrans such that Lt. Col. Ojukwu officially asked the relief agencies to supply his army. The relief support to Biafra was also financial since the people lacked monies. It should be recalled that in January 1968, the Nigerian federal military government introduced new bank notes – an act that rendered the millions of old Nigerian pounds in the hands and pockets of Biafrans valueless. In this situation, aid became necessary so as to be able to avoid the the collapse of the secessionist attempt. Admitting to this situation, the commander of the Biafran Army, Alexander Madiebo acknowledged that they eventually lost the war because they lacked money.[24]
Relief and mission organisations were the basic source of foreign exchange for the Biafrans, amounting to 4.3 million pounds, followed by the French secret service (2 million pounds) and donations from the Igbo in diaspora (780,000 pounds), the Igbo in Nigeria (100,000 pounds) among other concerned citizens in the West (100,000 pounds).[25]According to Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the only source of income available to Biafra as at that time was the hard currency spent by the Churches for yam and garri. Additionally, the Chief of Military planning for Biafra, Mike Okwechukwu confirmed that financing the war was largely accomplished through private and humanitarian contributions.[26] Also, much was diverted from funds raised abroad and those who wished to make strongly humanitarian contributions could give to give to agencies but those going to Biafra often did not ask any questions and the money and the money could be used to purchase arms in the global market.[27] Overall, out of $250 million of humanitarian aid to Biafra, it was estimated that fiver per cent was indirectly spent on military weapons – an equivalent to the amount of hard currency spent on arms by the federal military government of Nigeria.[28]
Conclusion
This seminar examined the role played by mission organisations, non-governmental organisations among other public and private humanitarian groups in the course of the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970. It started by exploring the cause and effect of the war after which it looked into the humanitarian activities that in formed the courseof the war. The seminar finds that humanitarian activities during the Nigeria-Biafra war became an issue of controversy.
On one hand, the British government argued that the most efficient way to have saved lives during the war was to shorten it by letting the Nigerians win while on the other hand, charity organisations and missions alleged that to stop their airlift would result in millions of deaths.[29] Whichever way, the war later ended on January 15, 1970 with the surrendering of the Biafrans. However, what cannot be forgotten about the war is that there were a lot of humanitarian crisis which ensued as a result of the blockade of the Biafran enclave. Chief among them was famine, hunger and diseases. Indeed, humanitarian and charity oreganisations like ICRC, Nord churchaid, Jesus Christ Airlines, Caritas, Oxfarm, Orthodox and Pentecostal churches among others contributed immensely in dousing the tension and crises that had erupted in the course of war.
References
Aaronson, M. “The Nigerian Civil War and Humanitarian Intervention”. In: Everill, B., Kaplan, J. (eds.). The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and aid in Africa. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
Constitutional Conferences in Nigeria.”https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/519227/IPOL_IDA(2015)519227_EN.pdf. (Accessed December 15, 2022).
Desgrandchamps, M. “Organising the unpredictable: the Nigeria-Biafra War and its impact on the ICRC,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 888, 2012, 1409-1432.
Eric, P. “The Amalgamation of Nigeria: Revisiting 1914 and the Centenary Celebrations.” Canadian Social Science, Vol. 12, no. 12, 2016.
Fadakinte, M. M. and Abdulkareem, M. “The Travails of Nigerian Federalism 1951-1999: A Federation in Crisis of constitutional engineering.” Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2021.
Fifty years after the Biafra War, a turning point for humanitarian assistance,” 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/fifty-years-after-biafra-war-tuning-point-humanitarian-assistance. (Accessed December 16, 2022).
Ikenwa, C. “Features of Richards Constitution of 1946.” https://nigerianfopedia.com.ng/features-of-richards-constitution-of-1946/ (Accessed December 14, 2022).
khan, R., Salim, A., Baluch, Z., Mehreen, K., and Kaleem, M. “British Colonialism and the Indirect Rule: A Hiachical Administrative Structure to control the unruly tribes.” Humanities and Social Sciences Review, Vol. 9, No. 9, 2021.
Montclos, M.P. “Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War: Lessons not learned.” Africa Development, Vol. xxxiv, No. 1, 2
Mwakikagile, G. Ethnic Politics in Kenya and Nigeria. (Hutington: Nova Publishers, 2001).
“On Aburi We Stand: The Distortion of Accord by Ojukwu,” https:www.vanguardngr.com/2011/1/11/on-aburi-we-stand-the-distortion-of-accord-by-ojukwu/(accessed December 17, 2022).
Obi-Ani, N. and Obi-Ani, P. “January 15 1966 Coup d’ etat reconsidered,” 2016. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305880217_JANUARY_15_1966_COUP_D’_ETAT_RECONSIDERED. (accessed December 15, 2022).
See AidWatch: http://www.observatoire-humanitaire.org/.
“Southern Nigeria Protectorate (1900-1914),” http:ww.dcstamps.com/southern-nigeria-protectorate/ Accessed December 10, 2022).
The Kano riot of 1953 broke out in the ancient city of Kano in Northern Nigeria between Northermers who opposed Nigeria’s independence and Southerners who supported immediate independence for Nigeria.
The May incident refers to series of tragic events that took place in May 1966. During this time, about 8,000 and 30,000 Igbos and easterners got killed in northern Nigeria.
Ugiagbe, I. “The Second Phase of the Nigerian Constitution under the British imperial rule (1951-1959). International Journal of Law, Vol. 4, No. 6, 2018.
[1] “Fifty years after the Biafra War, a turning point for humanitarian assistance,” 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/fifty-years-after-biafra-war-tuning-point-humanitarian-assistance. (Accessed December 16, 2022).
[2] Godfrey ,Mwakikagile, Ethnic Politics in Kenya and Nigeria. (Hutington: Nova Publishers, 2001), p. 176.
[3] M. Aaronson, “The Nigerian Civil War and Humanitarian Intervention”. In: Everill, B., Kaplan, J. (eds.). The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and aid in Africa. (London: Palgrave Macmillan,2013, pp. 3-9.
[4] “Southern Nigeria Protectorate (1900-1914),” http:ww.dcstamps.com/southern-nigeria-protectorate/ Accessed December 10, 2022).
[5] Paul Eric, “The Amalgamation of Nigeria: Revisiting 1914 and the Centenary Celebrations.” Canadian Social Science, Vol. 12, no. 12, 2016, pp. 66-68.
[6] R.khan, A. Salim, Z. Baluch, K. Mehreen and M. Kaleem, “British Colonialism and the Indirect Rule: A Hiachical Administrative Structure to control the unruly tribes.” Humanities and Social Sciences Review, Vol. 9, No. 9, 2021, pp. 1366-1372.
[7] C. Ikenwa, “Features of Richards Constitution of 1946.” https://nigerianfopedia.com.ng/features-of-richards-constitution-of-1946/ (Accessed December 14, 2022).
[8] Ibid.
[9] Imuetinyan Ugiagbe, “The Second Phase of the Nigerian Constitution under the British imperial rule (1951-1959). International Journal of Law, Vol. 4, No. 6, 2018, p. 28.
[10] The Kano riot of 1953 broke out in the ancient city of Kano in Northern Nigeria between Northermers who opposed Nigeria’s independence and Southerners who supported immediate independence for Nigeria.
[11] M.M. Fadakinte and M. Abdulkareem, “The Travails of Nigerian Federalism 1951-1999: A Federation in Crisis of constitutional engineering.” Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2021, pp. 19-27.
[12]“Constitutional Conferences in Nigeria.”https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/519227/IPOL_IDA(2015)519227_EN.pdf. (Accessed December 15, 2022).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ngozika Obi-Ani and Paul Obi-Ani, “January 15 1966 Coup d’ etat reconsidered,” 2016. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305880217_JANUARY_15_1966_COUP_D’_ETAT_RECONSIDERED. (accessed December 15, 2022).
[15] Ibid.
[16] “On Aburi We Stand: The Distortion of Accord by Ojukwu,” https:www.vanguardngr.com/2011/1/11/on-aburi-we-stand-the-distortion-of-accord-by-ojukwu/(accessed December 17, 2022).
[17] The May incident refers to series of tragic events that took place in May 1966. During this time, about 8,000 and 30,000 Igbos and easterners got killed in northern Nigeria.
[18] M. P. montclos, “Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War: Lessons not learned.” Africa Development, Vol. xxxiv, No. 1, 2009, pp. 69-82.
[19] Ibid.
[20] See AidWatch: http://www.observatoire-humanitaire.org/.
[21] Montclos, “Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War: Lessons not learned,” p. 73.
[22] Ibid.
[24] Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps, “Organising the unpredictable: the Nigeria-Biafra War and its impact on the ICRC,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 888, 2012, 1409-1432.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
