NIGERIA AND COLD WAR POLITICS, 1960-1991

NIGERIA AND COLD WAR POLITICS, 1960-1991

Introduction

The Cold War has been described as a diplomatic and unarmed warfare between the United States with her western allies and the Soviet Union with her Eastern allies. It was a war of the superpowers based on ideological hatred and political distrust. The period between 1945 through 1991 can be seen as a period of intense battle for ideological supremacy between proponents of the free market and democracy led by the United States and the forces of communism led by the Soviet Union. Spurred by motivation to proliferate their interests to other parts of the world, the foreign policies of these major actors had significant impact mostly on the political culture of the African continent.

The cold war politics describes Nigeria as a country that was pro-western relations. It had had no significant relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe compared to what was obtainable with the U.S. Although Nigeria has always leaned towards the west, the closeness of the relationship varied consequent upon what constitutes the interests of the parties involved. Nigeria’s western ties were originally formidable with Britain, its former colonial ruler. The ties which lasted until the January 15, 1966 coup made Nigeria to align with Britain on most issues. However, after the coup and the civil war, Nigerian leadership became less -favourable and concerned toward Britain, especially after it took a position of neutrality in the civil war, refused to sell arms to the federation and ignored the blockade against the seceding Biafra. In addition, Nigerian leaders also were bitter by Britain’s support of white-dominated governments in southern Africa.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were interested in Nigeria consequent upon its geo-political and economic potentials. For the United States, Nigeria’s oil was paramount. From 1966 to 1977, Nigeria and the United States had quite an interesting relationship. First, the duo took opposing positions over Southern African liberation. Further, Nigeria was angered by pro-Biafra propaganda in the United States and by America’s refusal to sell arms to the federation during the civil war. In addition, the Nigerian government had suspected the United States for having spearheaded the assassination of Murtala Muhammad.

Howbeit, with the coming into power of President Jimmy Carter in 1977, Nigerian relations with the United States suddenly changed as the United States recognized Nigeria as a stabilizing force in Africa and was willing to consult with Nigeria on African issues. The two governments appear to have similar interests in southern Africa, but this depended mostly upon continuing agreement and cooperation. Interestingly, once Ronald Reagan replaced Jimmy Carter as President, both countries again had divergent interests in southern Africa.

It is important to note that just as the balance of trade was not expected to shift dramatically with the opening of Eastern Europe, Nigeria’s political position was not expected to change also. In fact, in a time of shifting world coalitions, a position of non-alignment with leaning toward the West provided more options for Nigeria than ever. Based on the foregoing, the thrust of this article is to examine the place of Nigeria in Cold War politics with reference to Nigeria’s dynamism in her diplomatic cum economic relations with the cold war superpowers.

Anglo-American relations and the place of Nigeria in the Cold War

In assessing Britain’s position in Nigeria in February 1963, less than three years after independence, Marco Wyss observed that the United States ambassador in Lagos praised the British for a smooth transfer of power, but also noted that “British prestige and, therefore, influence have …been on decline in Nigeria ever since independence.” According to Joseph Palmer II, on one hand, this was the inevitable consequence of Britain’s diminishing great power role, the decreasing importance of the commonwealth following London’s shift towards Europe as well as Nigeria’s continued decolonization process after independence. But on the other hand, he observed that while American interest in Nigeria had increased, Nigerians were looking to the United States as their major hope for reducing the dependence on the U.K.

This time, the United States was already Nigeria’s most important national provider of foreign aid by having pledged almost twice as much as Britain to its national development plan. But when it came to military assistance, the Americans were largely absent. Despite Lagos’ efforts to diversify its sources of military assistance, it still relied heavily on Britain. On the other hand, though the United States had preference for development aid in Nigeria, it began to seriously consider more substantial military assistance to Nigeria by 1963. By the time the government of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was overthrown by the January 1966 coup, the United States prepared itself to assume the responsibility for training of the Nigerian army – an opportunity it had wanted and thus seized to influence its policies and programmes in Africa with Nigeria as a pointer. This was after the abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement in 1962.

The shift in the United States aid policy towards Nigeria explains the United States’ expansion of its influence in partnership with the British, who after the Suez crisis of 1956 teamed up with the Americans to fight the cold war believing that colonial reflexes would be counterproductive in winning over local elites and maintaining informal influence. Be that as it may, Nigel Ashton noted however, that the United States and British interests and policies also clashed during this period, for instance in Africa over the Congo.

Anglo-American relations were based on America’s Cold War policies towards Africa and Nigeria. The internalization of the East-West confrontation was slow to spread to Africa and the superpowers only began to take a closer interest in the region in the late 1950s in the course of decolonization. The Soviet Union and the United States wanted to gain the loyalty of the emerging states to their respective camps. In a bid to actualizing such aim, President Dwight D. Eisemhower believed that this could be achieved if the U.S relied on Britain and France. The United States began to attribute strategic importance to Africa with the arrival of President John F. Kennedy in the White House. The Congo crisis was of particular concern to the United States, because after being confronted with the secession of the mineral rich Katanga immediately after independence, a lack of support from the Eisemhower administration, and a largely ineffective United Nations peacekeeping operation, Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba had turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.

Protecting its interest, the United States deployed relatively important resources, and singled out specific African countries, notably Nigeria, on which to concentrate its efforts. Nigeria was central to the African strategy of President Kennedy and his aides. With this, Nigeria became the biggest recipient of U.S. aid south of the Sahara in the early 1960s. In the words of Bassey E. Ate, this brought Nigeria into a relationship of dependency and alignment with the U.S.

The role of military assistance in U. S. policy towards Nigeria

Why did the United States militarize its aid policy to Nigeria? In this section of the article, there will be need to provide an answer to why the United States unlike Britain, prioritize military aid to Nigeria other than other kinds of aid. In this regard, Wyss explains that the military dimension of the U.S. aid policy towards Nigeria predates the transition from British to American leadership in military assistance to Kenya in the 1970s, and was seen by the Nigerian leadership as a means to further reduce their dependency on the British. It was Nigeria’s quest for alternative sources of military assistance in reaction to domestic and regional pressures that triggered the militarization of U.S. aid policy.

More specifically, it was the Nigerian government’s western-oriented foreign relations that drove it in pursuit of reducing its military dependency on Britain, but simultaneously prevented it from looking beyond western, neutral and non-aligned countries for alternative sources of military assistance. This helps to explain why the Soviets and the Chinese, whose competition for world communist leadership heavily affected Africa as they often forced themselves into the continent in a a bid to spread their ideology. The U.S. at feared that military assistance to Nigeria would provoke an arms race and turn the Cold War into a very dangerous contest. As such, military assistance was limited and aimed at strengthening the domestic security and territorial integrity of African states.

The United States was increasingly concerned about domestic security in Nigeria, especially after the discovery of plans of a coup by supposedly Soviet and Ghanaian sponsored members of the Action Group (AG) led to the imprisonment of Obafemi Awolowo and a crisis in the western region in 1962. Against this backdrop of decreasing British influence, the U.S thus began to review its position on military assistance. The Americans wanted to assess with the British the security situation in Nigeria, and how they could best play a complementary role in strengthening the Nigerian security apparatus. In regard to the call for a heavier military involvement from the Bureau of African Affairs, in January 1963, following a recommendation of the U.S. Army’s African Division, Ambassador William C. Trimble, the Director of the office of the West Coast and Malian Affairs expressed his hope for an increase in the training programme for Nigerian military personnel. This also went in accordance with his lobbying inside the administration for a general increase in aid to Nigeria, which with $53.8 million for 1963 was already the major recipient of American development aid in Africa. Based on the foregoing, Nigeria was considered key to U.S. policy towards Africa.

In early 1964, the provision of military training to Nigerians in the U. S was extended. In addition, the U.S. agreed to largely symbolic arms supplies, such as a limited number of recoilless rifles and carbines. This remained unchanged till the end of the year, even though there were renewed calls for an increase in U.S. military assistance to Nigeria In the same vein, the U.S. wanted Nigerians to retain their army and police forces in the Congo to support the government. Meanwhile, in light of the mounting political tension in Nigeria between the main regionally dominated parties and within the Western region, by late 1964, U.S. had shifted its focus back on domestic security, and the related threat Sino-Soviet penetration. This situation seemed severe for the U.S. to justify an extension of its military assistance to Nigeria. The main aim was to strengthen internal security, and thereby help maintain national unity.

At this point, it should be noted that though the U.S. had maintained its interest in Africa during the Cold War through its aid policy to Nigeria, it still worked in collaboration with the British and other western allies with the notion of halting containing communism. During the ensuing Nigerian civil war, Presidents L. B. Johnson and Richard Nixon’s administrations imposed and upheld an arms embargo on the Nigeria and Biafra sides and left it to Britain to safeguard western interests in Lagos.

Nigeria-Soviet relations in the Cold War

On the other hand, Nigeria external relations with the USSR up to 1966 were not very cordial. But the relations began to improve from 1967 onwards and reached its climax at the end of the civil war (1970). Considering the generally cordial relations between the Tafawa Balewa administration and the Soviet Union, Moscow’s initial response to the January 1966 military coup led by General Ironsi was predictably favourable. The success of the coup demonstrated the unpopularity of the former regime which had been pictured by western propaganda as a ‘model democracy’ for the rest of Africa. Ironically, the Soviet Union had always championed the Igbos as a forward-looking people, but after the repeated massacres, the Soviet press remained silent in its report of the intended progress of Gowon’s regime. The USSR had not initially liked Gowon’s July countercoup. It assumed that under Gowon, a British-Northern coalition had form again and regains control of the country. Nevertheless, after Gowon released Obafemi Awolowo, Moscow began to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards Gowon, and by later the Soviet press was praising him.

In January 1967, a soviet team of economists, metallurgists, and engineers went to Nigeria to undertake a study of the possibilities for developing an iron and steel industry. Thus, Russia had already made a de facto commitment to Gowon, and was only a matter of time before its sympathies for Igbo people would be abandoned in favour of open support for Gowon. The decisive break came on March 31, 1967 as Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu announced the Eastern region’s firm intention to secede from Nigeria. With this incident, Moscow accused Ojukwu of pursuing tribal separatism under the protection of ‘western imperialism.’ In a bid to help Nigeria forestall order, Russia signed an important cultural agreement with Gowon which was employed five months later for negotiating an arms deal. In effect, it supported Nigeria.

With the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in July 1967, the USSR openly backed up the Nigerian government under the regime of General Yakubu Gowon. Justifying its decision, the USSR in the words of Yevgenii Korshunov posits thus:

“Nigeria is one country and the successful solution to the problem lies not in a greater or lesser autonomy for her regions but in the uniting of all progressive forces on a basis of wholly national interests in the struggle for a better life for the working masses in all regions and all nationalities in the country.”

The abovementioned explains the USSR’s notion on the need for Nigeria’s continued existence despite the clamor for secession by the Biafra agitators led by Colonel Ojukwu. However, the USSR could have given aid to neither side and remained politically neutral. Also, it could have publicly given political support to the Federal Government but withheld material aid; conversely, it could have declared its support for Biafra but withheld material aid; provided material aid to the Federal Government; or provided material aid to the secessionists.

The weeks following the announcement of Biafran independence by Colonel Ojukwu were filled with fidgeting attempts by the Federal Military Government (FMG) of General Gowon to procure arms. Although the Soviets at first moved cautiously, striving to keep open as many options as possible, Britain’s refusal to supply Lagos with air force equipment, the declared neutral position of the United States at the outbreak of the war, and the role of the radical members of General Gowon’s war cabinet, all helped the Kremlin reach a decision.

In late June 1967, a four-man Nigerian mission headed Moscow, prompting immediate hearsays that the visit was in fact an arms-procurement expedition.In less than a month later, another Nigerian delegation went to the Soviet Union. The delegation included Chief Anthony Enahoro, the commissioner for the ministries of information and labour in the Federal Military Government. On August 2, 1967, Chief Enahoro met with the Soviet deputy Pime Minister at the Kremlin with the aim of signing a cultural agreement, which seemed less-serious, if not frivolous for a country confronting an existential crisis. Despite the mounting evidence to the country, both sides continued to insist that arts and sports, and not the aircraft and the bazookas, constituted the subject of the talks.

Furthermore, on August 8, 1967, General Gowon admitted to signing a deal or the procurement of an unspecified number of Czech aircraft but also stressed the strictly commercial nature f the transaction. In the months following the signing of the deal, Soviet-friendly groups like the Nigerian-Soviet Friendship Society, the Committee of Solidarity with Asia and Africa, and the Nigerian Trade Union Council multiplied themselves in Nigeria. These organizations popularized Soviet achievements, culture and ideology through their meetings, publications, symposia and film screenings. In the fall of 1967, the Soviets opened a new $15,000 cultural centre in the district of Surulere in Lagos and four Moskvich car dealerships opened doors around the country. In addition, the Soviet military equipment and aircraft began arriving in Nigeria, and it is reasonable to assume that the two Nigerian missions to Moscow were related to an arms deal. From this time on, arms supplies were steadily increased, and Soviet journals, newspapers and radio broadcasts began a sustained bitter campaign of condemnation against the Biafran leaders.

By the second quarter of 1967, the alliance between Kremlin and the Federal Military Government had been acknowledged by both sides. On October 17, Lagos made public a letter to General Gowon dispatched a few days earlier by the Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin. The letter indicated that the Soviets had chosen sides in the conflict and it articulated Soviet support for the FMG in no uncertain terms. In November 1968, an important Soviet-Nigerian agreement was signed: Russia promised to help finance the Kainji dam, and it also provided assistance for the creation of the Nigerian iron and steel industry. In fact, the Soviet commitment throughout the war was entirely consistent. It was based on a calculated scheme, non-ideological in content, limited to supplying arms and gradually increasing economic and cultural ties.

It is no common act that Soviet aid and assistance was an important element in the Federal Military Government’s success in maintaining the unity of Nigeria. In agreement to this view, Brigadier Kumbo, Nigerian ambassador in Moscow commented: “that in the final analysis, Russian support was responsible for the Federal victory more than any other single thing, more than all other things put together.” On the other hand, let it be known that the fundamental reason for Soviet support of the FMG was that it controlled one of Africa’s most important countries; a region of strategic importance which had long been under British influence, and Russia, unexpectedly, had the opportunity to replace western influence, because of the initial reluctance of the British and Americans to supply arms to the FMG. However, in search of a better source that would provide the resources needed for its victory in the civil war against Biafra, Nigeria welcomed the Eastern bloc as an ally despite the fact that it had been pro-western.

Conclusion

The article examined significant issues bothering on the place of Nigeria in Cold War politics from 1945 through 1991. It expatiated on the nature and dynamics of Nigerian relations with the Cold War Superpowers (U .S. and USSR) as well as their allies; as well as the impact of such relations on Nigerian foreign policy and political culture. The work explains that at independence in 1960, Nigeria had been under British tutelage. At the same time in question, the country was systematically linked to the west economically, politically and to some extent culturally. Following the same leadership style of the colonial masters, post-independence Nigerian leaders showed sentimental attachment to the west as they looked upon them for direction. A typical example as recorded by T.A. Imobighe, was during the visit of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa to the United States in July 1961. In his address to the U.S. Congress, he stated thus: “we admire the American way of life and we respect the people of the United States for their love for freedom. Like you, we in Nigeria cherish freedom and individual liberty.”

As for Balewa, communism for evil, thus, his government delayed in opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, throughout the first republic, the government failed to grasp the immense advantages of diversified external markets, despite criticisms and public protest. Howbeit, as the years passed by, events started changing for the better. The opposition of the Action Group (AG) and the radical youth movement helped to force Balewa’s regime to abrogate the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact of 1962. It was only when the hard grip on Nigeria by the west was drastically reduced that Nigerian foreign policy began to register some footprints to ascertain her leadership role in Africa.

The work highlighted on the Anglo-American relations and its impact on Nigeria. It noted that it was in a bid to reduce its dependence on the British through the abrogation pact that the United States became an alternative source of assistance. The United States on its own had for long, desired an alliance with Nigeria with which its influence on the African continent is guaranteed. Again, in order to contain the communist ideology of the Soviet Union from gaining currency in Africa, the U.S. engendered formidable military and economic assistance in the continent. Interestingly, the work also explored the course of the Nigerian civil war and how it aided the diversification of Nigeria’s foreign policy from pro-western to pro-eastern. The assistance Nigeria enjoyed from the Soviet Union also helped to concretize both countries relation

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